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THE INVENTION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Dorothy J. Glancy*
The right to privacy is, as a legal concept, a fairly recent invention.
It dates back to a law review article published in December of 1890 by
two young Boston lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.'
Roscoe Pound described this article as having done "nothing less than
add a chapter to our law."2 Fewer than ninety years later it is surpris-
ing to find that this relatively new chapter in our law appears to have
fallen into such disarray that one United States Supreme Court Justice
has characterized the right to privacy cases decided by his Court as
"defying categorical description."3  Paradoxically, a categorical
description of the right to privacy was precisely what Warren and
Brandeis invented in 1890. My purpose here is to place in historical
perspective the inventors' original conception of the right to privacy.
My hope is that careful consideration of this original conception will
offer a way out of the current welter of competing right-to-privacy the-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara; Visiting Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Arizona. B.A., Wellesley, 1967; J.D. Harvard, 1970.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
2. Letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916) quotedin A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A
FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1956).
3. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.). Justice Rehnquist is not alone in
his puzzlement over what, if anything, the right to privacy means. Twenty years earlier Judge
Biggs more whimsically likened the law of privacy to a "haystack in a hurricane. Ettore v. Philco
Telev. Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956). Even such a strong advocate of increased
protections for the right to privacy as Arthur R. Miller had to admit that privacy law is "a thing of
threads and patches" in his seminal work, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169 (1971).
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ories.4 However, this Article is intended not as a polemic but as an
explication.
Warren and Brandeis originally described the right to privacy as
an already existing common law right which embodied protections for
each individual's "inviolate personality"5 : "The common law secures
to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to
others . . . fix[ing] the limits of the publicity which shall be given
them."6 To its inventors, the right to privacy meant that each individ-
ual had the right to choose to share or not to share with others informa-
tion about his or her "private life, habits, acts, and relations."7
Warren and Brandeis argued that it was necessary for the legal
system to recognize the right to privacy because, when information
about an individual's private life is made available to others, it tends to
influence and even to injure the very core of an individual's personal-
ity--"his estimate of himself."'  Warren's and Brandeis' original con-
cept of the right to privacy thus embodied a psychological insight, at
that time relatively unexplored, that an individual's personality, espe-
cially his or her self-image, can be affected, and sometimes distorted or
injured, when information about that individual's private life is made
available to other people.' In simplest terms, for Warren and Brandeis
the right to privacy was the right of each individual to protect his or her
psychological integrity by exercising control over information which
both reflected and affected that individual's personality.' 0
This right to privacy was not new." Warren and Brandeis did not
even coin the phrase, "right to privacy,"'12 nor its common soubriquet,
4. Two recent symposia on privacy contain a sampling of the wide variety of theoretical
positions. See 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978) and 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975). It is, of course,
possible to take the Humpty Dumpty approach of making the right to privacy mean anything we
want it to mean. See L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE, ch. 6 (1872). However, such an approach tends to be costly in terms of conceptual coher-
ence as well as simple communication and rational discussion about the right to privacy.
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
6. Id. at 198.
7. Id. at 216. It was a right to privacy and not privacy itself that Warren and Brandeis
invented. They assumed that privacy itself was a condition, specifically, a state of psychological
security characterized by an individual's being in control of reflections of his or her personality in
the minds of others. This notion of privacy is discussed in greater detail in relating the right to
privacy to the tradition of American individualism at notes 109-39 infra.
8. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 197.
9. See generally I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958); E. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN
PUBLIC PLACES (1963); E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959);
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
10. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 197. The duality of Warren's and Brandeis'
concept of the right to privacy as both a part of and a protection for individual personality is
discussed more fully at notes 114-27 infra.
11. See Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
272 (1966) for a discussion of the historical development of a right to privacy beginning with
Biblical and ancient Greek conceptions.
12. See, eg., T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
[Vol. 21
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"the right to be let alone."' 3 Indeed, much of the force of their argu-
ment for legal recognition and enforcement of the right to privacy de-
rives from their ingenious evocation of a broad historical sweep in
which such legal recognition and enforcement appear as natural and
inevitable developments.' 4 All that Warren and Brandeis ever claimed
to have invented was a legal theory which brought into focus a com-
mon "right to privacy" denominator already present in a wide variety
of legal concepts and precedents from many different areas of the com-
mon law. It is for that reason that their article reads as if the authors
had literally ransacked every traditional area of the common law they
could find-such as contracts, property, trusts, copyright, protection of
trade secrets, and torts-in order to pluck out the already existing legal
principle underlying all of these various parts of the common law. This
underlying legal principle was the right to privacy. Their novel legal
theory gave this principle shape and form.
Although primarily intent on establishing the right to privacy as a
practical legal protection which could function in the social context of
their day, Warren and Brandeis were also participants in what Roscoe
Pound called "the organizing, systematizing era after the Civil War."'15
Accordingly, they carefully located the right to privacy within the con-
text of the highly schematic jurisprudence of late nineteenth century
American law. They placed the right to privacy within the more gen-
eral category of the individual's right to be let alone. 6 The right to be
let alone was itself part of an even more general right, the right to enjoy
life, which was in turn part of the individual's fundamental right to life
itself. The right to life was part of the familiar triad of fundamental,
inherent, individual rights reflected in the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ."'I Unlike the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 210 (1880); Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV-To His Own
Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER'S MAGAZINE 58 (July 1890).
13. Thomas Cooley appears to have coined the phrase "the right to be let alone" in his TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1879): "Personalimmunit.--the right of one's person may be
said to be a right of complete immunity; the right to be alone." Id. at 29. Warren and Brandeis
were careful to credit Cooley with this creation and cited the second edition of the treatise. War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 nA.
14. Warren and Brandeis deliberately concluded their article with the poweiful image of the
common law right to privacy in the hands of the embattled individual as an age-old weapon
"forged in the slow fire of the centuries, and to-day fitly tempered to his hand." Warren & Bran-
deis, supra note 1, at 220.
15. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 157 (1938).
16. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205. "Preventing publication, is merely an instance
of... the more general right of the individual to be let alone." Id. Accord, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment later guaranteed this same triad of
individual rights against state deprivation. Id., amend. XIV, § 1. See G. WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA 229-55 (1978), for an interesting argument regarding the slightly different triad of fun-
damental individual rights which Thomas Jefferson included in the Declaration of Independence,
which states: "We declare these truths to be self evident,-that all men are. . . endowed by their
19791
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United States Supreme Court in recent opinions, Warren and Brandeis
carefully disassociated the right to privacy both from the right to liberty
and from the right to property."8 According to Warren and Brandeis,
the right to liberty "secures extensive civil privileges," but not pri-
vacy. 19 They also contrasted the right to property, which comprised the
individual's material interests, "every form of possession-intangible as
well as tangible," with the right to privacy's concern for spiritual inter-
ests. 20 A schematic representation of Warren's and Brandeis' place-
ment of their concept of the right to privacy in the corpus juris of





Right to Be Let Alone
right to privacy
In seeking to understand the original concept of the right to pri-
vacy, it is important to bear in mind just who its inventors were. In
1890, when they published their famous article, The Right to Privacy,
Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis had been friends for at least
fifteen years. They had been classmates at the Harvard Law School
from which they graduated second and first in their class, respectively.
They had been law partners from 1879 to 1889, when the death of War-
Creator with inalienable rights; that among these are rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness."
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
19. Id Contra, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
20. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193, 205. Contra, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), which appears to treat privacy as a property right on the part of
the "human cannon ball" to his performance.
[Vol. 21
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ren's father required Warren to resign from the partnership in order to
manage his father's business. The name of their Boston law firm re-
mained "Warren & Brandeis" until 1897.21 According to Professor
Paul Freund, Brandeis was the primary author of The Right to Pri-
vacy,22 although the article, like others on which Warren and Brandeis
collaborated, bore the authors' names exactly as they appeared in the
law firm's name.23
Samuel D. Warren was the son of a wealthy paper manufacturer,
and a member of the well-established commercial elite in Boston.
Upon graduation from the Harvard Law School in 1878, Warren began
law practice in Boston. A year later he invited Brandeis to return to
Boston from Louisville, Kentucky, to join him in establishing a law
firm. Warren's marriage to the daughter of Senator Thomas Francis
Bayard, Sr. in 1883 further solidified Warren's place among the social
elite of Boston, who were favorite targets for the late nineteenth cen-
tury sensationalist press.24
In contrast, Brandeis was something of an outsider.25 He was the
son of Jewish immigrants from Bohemia who, after settling in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, had suffered financial reverses just prior to Louis
Brandeis' entry into the Harvard Law School. As a southerner, a man
of limited financial means, and a Jew, Brandeis brought a certain
amount of objectivity and a more democratic approach to the argument
for the right to privacy. Of course, Brandeis also possessed a remarka-
ble creative intelligence which caused Chief Justice Gray of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to describe him as "the most
ingenious and most original lawyer I ever met."26 In 1879, Brandeis
himself mused about "the almost ridiculous pleasure which the discov-
ery or invention of a legal theory gives me."'27 His first prominent in-
vention was the right to privacy.
Precisely why Warren and Brandeis chose to write about the right
to privacy may never be fully known. According to Mason, Brandeis
somewhat wryly commented on the privacy article many years after its
publication, observing, "[t]his, like so many of my public activities, I
21. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 68.
22. Freund, Privacy.: One Concept or Many, in NOMos XIII: PRIVACY 182, 184 (Pennock &
Chapman eds. 1971).
23. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 650 n.23.
24. Id. at 47, 56, 70. See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383-84, 423 (1960).
25. Brandeis' biographer, Mason, goes to some pains to point out and repeatedly underscore
that during this early period of his professional life, Brandeis was not only accepted but much
admired and sought out by Boston society as a brilliant young legal scholar. A MASON, supra note
2, at 61-91. Nevertheless, he came from a background far different from that of the Boston Brah-
min, Samuel Warren.
26. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 61.
27. Id. at 59.
19791
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did not volunteer to do."28 In an exchange of correspondence fifteen
years after The Right to Privacy was published, Warren and Brandeis
agreed that it was "a specific suggestion of [Warren's], as well as [War-
ren's] deep-seated abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy, which
led to our taking up the inquiry."29 The immediate catalyst for the
article was apparently Warren's pique at finding intimate details of the
Warren family's home life spread out on the society pages of such
newspapers as The Saturday Evening Gazette. °
But the authors almost certainly had other motives as well. It is
likely that they desired to circulate the firm name, "Warren & Bran-
deis," as widely as possible. In addition, at least one of Brandeis' mo-
tives for writing the article may have been his desire to produce novel
and interesting copy for the Harvard Law Review, then in its fourth
year of publication. Among the attractions that brought Brandeis from
Louisville to Boston in 1879 was the possibility of assuming the editor-
ship of a legal periodical." Brandeis aided in the founding of the
Harvard Law Review in 1887 and became a trustee and the first treas-
urer of the Review. Since Warren and Brandeis had contributed an
article to the second and third volumes of the HarvardLaw Review,32 it
appears that Brandeis was interested in providing provocative copy for
this fledgling publication.
The popular intellectual press immediately greeted Warren's and
Brandeis' concept of the right to privacy as an idea whose time had
come. The Atlantic Monthly commented:
Surely it is impossible that the law, which we are accustomed to
regard as an agency for protecting our lives and our pockets, with a
perfect disregard of feelings, should stoop to concern itself with the
privacy of the individual; and yet nothing less than this appears to be
the conclusion of a learned and interesting article in a recent number
of the Harvard Law Review, entitled The Right to Privacy.
It seems that the great doctrine of Development rules not only in
biology and theology, but in the law as well; so that whenever, in the
long process of civilization, man generates a capacity for being made
miserable by his fellows in some new way, the law, after a decent
28. Id. at 70.
29. Letter from Brandeis to Warren (April 8, 1905). Warren agreed: "You are right of
course about the genesis of the article." Letter from Warren to Brandeis (April 10, 1905). Both
letters are quoted in I LETrERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS, 1870-1907: URBAN REFORMER 303
(Urofsky & Levy eds. 1971).
30. A. MASON, stupra note 2, at 70. Prosser's suggestion that it was the marriage of Sam
Warren's daughter which precipitated the article appears to have been a product of Prosser's im-
agination, since Sam Warren had been married for only seven years at the time the article was
written. See Prosser, supra note 24, at 423.
31. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 54.
32. Warren & Brandeis, The Law ofPonds, 3 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1889); Warren & Brandeis,
The Waluppa Pond Cases, 2 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1888).
[Vol. 21
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interval, steps in to protect him.3 3
There was, in short, a sense of general agreement that the time and
place were ripe for the invention of a legal theory for enforcement of
the right to privacy.34
By 1890, the United States had witnessed enormous increases in
population, primarily as the result of immigration.35 The east coast of
the United States was becoming ever more densely urbanized. In the
hundred years from 1790, when the Bureau of the Census began keep-
ing records, to 1890, the population of the United States had grown
from four million to sixty-three million people. The population of ur-
ban areas had grown by more than a hundredfold.36 In the decades
between the end of the Civil War and 1890, more than eight million
people had immigrated to the United States.37 The North American
continent was beginning to fill up. In 1890, the very year in which
Warren and Brandeis invented the right to privacy, the Superintendent
of the Census declared that the frontier was officially closed.38 Social
commentators, such as E.L. Godkin, typically remarked that "local life
is now much less isolated than it used to be," and decried crowded
living conditions in the cities as a major factor leading to growing inter-
ference with individual privacy." Warren and Brandeis pointed to
"[tihe intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civili-
zation,"40 as among the major causes of growing interference with the
right to privacy.
In addition, technological progress during the post-Civil War de-
cades had brought to Boston and the rest of the United States "count-
less, little-noticed revolutions" in the form of a variety of inventions
which made the personal lives and personalities of individuals increas-
ingly accessible to large numbers of others, irrespective of acquain-
tance, social or economic class, or the customary constraints of
propriety.4 1 Bell invented the telephone in Boston; the first commercial
33. The Right To Be Let 4lone, 67 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 428-29 (1891).
34. See The Defense of Privacy, 66 THE SPECTATOR 200 (February 7, 1891), which noted:
Cultivated Americans begin so keenly to hate the system of excessive publicity, which
they themselves have been mainly instrumental in producing, that they are discussing
ways and means of restricting it by legal penalties. The Harvard Law Review is even
inclined to hold, though not, we imagine, with any great certainty, that the existing law
of Massachusetts, which is in substance English law, would, if fairly interpreted, afford a
means of punishing intrusions on private life.
See Comment, 3 THE GREEN BAG 524, 525 (1891).
35. 0. HANDLIN, IMMIGRATION AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1959).
36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 11-12 (1965).
37. 0. HANDLIN, OUT OF MANY: A STUDY GUIDE TO CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1964).
38. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1947).
39. Godkin, supra note 12, at 62.
40. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
41. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE at xiii (1973).
HeinOnline  -- 21 Ariz. L. Rev.  7 1979
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telephone exchange opened there in 1877, while Warren and Brandeis
were students at the Harvard Law School.42 By 1890 there were also
telegraphs, fairly inexpensive portable cameras, sound recording de-
vices, and better and cheaper methods of making window glass. 43 War-
ren and Brandeis recognized that these advances in technology,
coupled with intensified newspaper enterprise, increased the vulnera-
bility of individuals to having their actions, words, images, and person-
alities communicated without their consent beyond the protected circle
of family and chosen friends. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and
Brandeis echoed the general concern of their contemporaries that "re-
cent inventions and business methods" such as "instantaneous photo-
graphs and newspaper enterprise . . . and numerous mechanical
devices" threatened to collect and disseminate personal information
about individuals to the world at large.44 It was their declared inten-
tion to outline a "principle which may be invoked to protect the pri-
vacy of the individual" against this burgeoning technology-"from
invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the
possessor of any other modern device for recording or reproducing
scenes or sounds."'4 5 That principle was the right to privacy.
NEWSPAPERIZATION
Henry James coined the term "newspaperization" to describe the
main problem Warren and Brandeis designed their theory of the right
to privacy to solve. 6 In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis
specifically addressed the evils of unwanted newspaper publicity:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle
and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details
of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the do-
mestic circle.47
The dismay of Samuel Warren and his family at finding their personal
lives minutely detailed in the society columns of such scandal sheets as
the Saturday Evening Gazette was just one example of the more general
42. J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 59-101 passim (1976).
43. D. BooRsTIN, supra note 41, at 343-44, 374, 387-88, 390-91.
44. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
45. Id. at 206.
46. H. JAMES, Preface to THE REVERBERATOR, MADAME DE MAUVEs; A PASSIONATE PIL-
GRIM AND OTHER TALES xiv (1950).
47. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
[Vol. 21
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contemporary social problem for which Warren and Brandeis designed
the right to privacy as a legal solution.
Ironically it was a newspaperman, E.L. Godkin, who appears to
have set the stage for Warren's and Brandeis' invention of a legal con-
cept of a right to privacy. Just six months before Warren and Brandeis
published The Right to Privacy, Godkin had published an article on the
same subject in Scribner's Magazine.4" Although Warren and Brandeis
later expressly disavowed the suggestion that the Godkin article had
caused them to write about the right to privacy,49 Godkin's influence
on Warren and Brandeis is apparent in numerous ways. One of the
most striking features shared by the two articles is the sweeping pano-
rama of the historical development of human sensitivity, culminating
in the right to privacy. 0 Even some of Brandeis' famed rhetoric about
the threats which newspapers pose to individual privacy appears to
have been inspired by Godkin's article.5 But the newspaperman
Godkin was unable to suggest any realistic way for an individual to
protect his or her privacy. Aside from commenting that "there is cer-
tain peculiar fitness in protecting reputation or privacy against libel or
intrusion by the cudgel or the horsewhip," 52 Godkin could suggest
48. Godkin, supra note 12.
49. In response to Elbridge Adams' suggestion in The Right of Privacy and its Relation to the
Law ofLibel, 30 AM. L. REV. 37, 37 (1905), that the Godkin article had caused Warren and
Brandeis to write The Right to Privacy, Brandeis commented, "[m]y own recollection is that it was
not Godkin's article" but Warren's suggestion "which led to our taking up the inquiry [into pri-
vacy]." Letter to Sam Warren from Louis Brandeis (April 8, 1905), reprintedin LEr-rERs OF Louis
D. BRANDEIS, supra note 29, at 303.
50. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193-95; Godkin, supra note 12, at 59.
51. Compare, for example, Warren's and Brandeis' statement of the newspaperization prob-
lem quoted in the text accompanying note 47 supra, with Godkin's earlier statement of the same
problem:
Privacy is a distinctly modem product....
The advent of the newspapers, or rather of a particular class of newspapers, has
made a great change. It has converted curiosity into what economists call an effectual
demand, and gossip into a marketable commodity. The old Paul Pry whom our fathers
despised and caricatured, and who was roundly kicked and cuffed on the stage for his
indiscretions, has become a great wholesale dealer in an article of merchandise for which
he finds a ready sale, and by which he frequently makes a fortune. In other words,
gossip about private individuals is now printed, and makes its victim, with all his perfec-
tions on his head, known hundreds of thousands of miles away from his place of abode;
and, what is worst of all, brings to his knowledge exactly what is said about him, with all
its details.
Godkin, supra note 12, at 65-66. Compare also Godkin's claim that the right to privacy is a
natural right:
The right to decide how much knowledge of this personal thought and feeling, and how
much knowledge, therefore, of his tastes, and habits, of his own private doings and af-
fairs, and those of his family living under his roof, the public at large shall have, is as
much one of his natural rights as his right to decide how he shall eat and drink, what he
shall wear, and in what manner he shall pass his leisure hours.
Id. at 65, with Warren's and Brandeis' assertion: "The common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
52. Godkin, supra note 12, at 61.
1979]
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"only one remedy for the violation of the right to privacy"; that was
"attaching social discredit to invasions of it on the part of conductors of
the press." 3 Warren and Brandeis argued that the common law af-
forded better means to vindicate the right to privacy against news-
paperization through legal enforcement of the right to privacy.
During the 1880's, disgust at excessive newspaper discussion of
private matters had grown into a sense of outrage at yellow journal-
ism's encroachments on the private lives of individuals. The writings
of Henry James perhaps best illustrate this social phenomenon.5 4 In
The Reverberator, published in 1888, James created the paridigm of
the type of predatory newspaper reporter whose activities prompted
Warren and Brandeis to design the right to privacy just two years later:
The society-news of every quarter of the globe, furnished by the
prominent members themselves--oh they can be fixed, you'll see!-
from day to day and from hour to hour and served up hot at every
breakfast table in the United States: that's what the American people
are going to have .... I'm going for the inside view, the choice bits,
the chronique intime, as they say here; what the people wants just
what ain't told, and I'm going to tell it. Oh they're bound to have the
plums! That's about played out, anyway, the idea of sticking up a
sign of "private" and "hands off" and "no thoroughfare" and think-
ing you can keep the place to yourself. You ain't going to be able
any longer to monopolize any fact of general interest, and it ain't
going to be possible to keep out anywhere the light of the press. Now
what I'm going to do is to set up the biggest lamp yet made and make
it shine all over the place. We'll see who's private then, and whose
hands are off, and who'll frustrate the People-the People that wants
to know. That's a sign of the American People that they do want to
know, and it's the sign of George P. Flack. . .that he's going to help
them.55
Warren's and Brandeis' express purpose in inventing the right to pri-
53. Id. at 67.
54. E.g., H. JAMES, THE BOSTONIANS (1886 ed.). In this novel, James caricatured a Boston
sociey newspaper reporterh.
or this igenuous son of his age all distinction between the person and the artist had
ceased to exist; the writer was personal, the person food for newsboys, and everything
and every one were every one's business. All things, with him, referred themselves to
print, and print meant simply infinite reporting, a promptitude of announcement, abu-
sive when necessary, or even when not, about his fellow citizens. He poured contumely
on their private life, on their personal appearance, with the best conscience in the world.
Id. at 122-23. James also provided a short vignette of the kind of newspaper prying which so
annoyed Warren and Brandeis: After a small luncheon where a young woman "discoursed to a
dozen matrons and spinsters, selected by her hostess with infinite consideration and many spiritual
scruples," a newspaper account of this private luncheon, "presumably from the hand of [a news-
paper reporter], who naturally had not been present, appeared with extraordinary promptness in
an evening-paper." Id. at 126.
55. H. JAMES, THE REVERBERATOR 62 (Chas. Scribner's Son ed. 1908).
[Vol. 21
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vacy was the vindication of individual sensibility against precisely these
activities and attitudes.
During the closing decades of the nineteenth century an affirma-
tive desire for publicity on the part of some all-too-willing subjects of
newspaper accounts compounded the newspaperization problem. 6
Warren and Brandeis viewed this unnatural appetite for publicity as
one of the most pernicious aspects of the "lowering of social standards"
which press invasions of privacy caused. 7 Shortly after The Right to
Privacy was published, Brandeis wrote to Alice Goldmark, whom he
later married:
Our hope is to make people see that invasions of privacy are not
necessarily bourne-and then make them ashamed of the pleasure
they take in subjecting themselves to such invasions....
The most perhaps that we can accomplish is to start a back-fire,
as the woodsmen or the prairiemen do.58
In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis warned of the "be-
littl[ing] and pervert[ing]" influence of newspaperization, "dwarfing the
thoughts and aspirations of a people."59 Newspaperization tended to
create a distorted appetite for more newspaper publicity, which in turn
tended to legitimize newspaperization itself, thereby making it even
more difficult for individuals of more refined sensibilities to protect
their privacy.
Concern about the evils caused by the newspaperization of private
life was by no means new in the 1880's and 1890's. Earlier in the nine-
teenth century, James Fenimore Cooper had been among the best
known and most persistent critics of press intrusions on the private
56. In 1888, THE SPECTATOR had addressed this problem of publicity-seekers:
It is quite obvious that many men, and not a few women, are not half-satisfied unless
they form the subjects of paragraphs in the papers, of articles in Truth, of rejoinders in
the World, of sketches in Vanity Fair, of caricatures in Punch, of mysterious allusions
anywhere, and that this has gone so far, that some journalists regard with a sort of be-
nevolent self-satisifaction their adroitness in lifting the veil of anonymity which the eti-
quette of journalism has hitherto drawn over private life, and almost credit themselves
with philanthropy for liberating a few human beings from the misfortune of common
privacy.
The wish of private persons to be talked about and thought about and written about
by people who have no solid facts on which to base their estimate of them, and who must
make them the centres of mere gossip, if they make a fuss about them at all, is a diseased
wish which has a solely corrupting tendency. Moreover, that kind of self-consciousness
is purely intoxicating, and, what is worse, inspires an ever deeper and deeper passion for
the intoxicating draught. Publicity without public duty and without conferring on the
public any power to verify the discharge of duty by the person thus made spuriously
public, is one of the most heady and poisonous of the ingredients of private life.
The Tastefor Privacy and Publicity, 61 THE SPECrATOR 782 (1888). See Godkin, supra note 12, at
66-67; Godkin, The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION 496 (1891).
57. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
58. Letter from Louis Brandeis to Alice Goldmark (December 28, 1890), quotedin LETTERS
oF Louis B. BRANDEIS, supra note 29, at 97.
59. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 196.
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lives and sensibilities of individuals: "If newspapers are useful in over-
throwing tyrants it is only to establish a tyranny of their own. The
press tyrannizes over public men, letters, the arts, the stage, and even
over private life."'6° Cooper's personal anger at what he considered to
be the outrageous impertinence of the Whig newspapers, which had
published accounts of his private activities, vented itself not only in his
writings61 but also in a tangled web of legal actions against a number of
newspapers.62 Curiously, one type of legal action used by Cooper to
vindicate his right to privacy against newspaperization was no longer
available to victims of accurate newspaperization by Warren's and
Brandeis' era. This legal action was known as criminal libel, a contro-
versial branch of the law of defamation which by 1890 had virtually
withered away as a viable protection for individual privacy.63
The original conception of criminal libel as applied in the courts of
the United States in cases such as Cooper's derived from Blackstone's
classic description in his Commentatories on the Laws of England:
Of a nature very similar to challenges are libels, libellifamosi, which,
taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings,
pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the
sense under which we are now to consider them, are malicious defa-
mations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by
either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to
wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. The
direct tendency of these libels is the breach of the public peace, by
stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed
60. J. CoopeR, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT 183 (Penguin ed. 1969) (first published 1838).
61. E.g., J. COOPER, HOME AS FOUND 66, 179, 208-11 (1838), in which Cooper mercilessly
caricatured Steadfast Dodge as a typical corrupt newspaper editor, and J. COOPER, THE AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRAT, supra note 60, at 183. Cooper published both in a single year, 1838.
62. See, e.g., Stone v. Cooper, 2 Denio 293 (N.Y. Ct. of Err. 1845); Cooper v. Greeley &
McElrath, 1 Denio, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); People v. Webb, I Hill 178 (N.Y. 1841) (a criminal
libel action); Cooper v. Barber, 24 Wend. 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
63. See FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 117-37 (H. Nel-
son ed. 1967). See also L. LEvY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 19, 182-88, 257-58 (1960); Frank-
lin, The Origins and Constitutionality ofLimitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 789, 789-805 (1964); Rosenberg, The New Law of PolitcaLibel A Historical Perspective, 28
RUTGERS L. REv. 1141, 1142-52 (1975). Although the right of privacy bears certain similarities to
the earlier law of criminal libel in that both share the purpose of discouraging publication of true
information which offends the subject of that information, the two legal theories also differ in a
number of important respects. Criminal libel was expressly a government prosecution aimed atpreserving the legitimacy of persons in political authority, as wel as at preventing public disorer
attendant upon self-help revenge for the publication of embarrassing true information. In con-
trast, Warren's and Brandeis' right to privacy was a private cause of action, aimed not at preserv-
ing political authority or preventing breaches of the peace, but at allowing each individual,
whether or not in political office, to bring an action for damages to vindicate his or her internal
feelings, "his estimate of himself." Based on the more general right of each individual "to be let
alone," tort actions for interference with the right to privacy were designed to vindicate the indi-
vidual's control over the exposure to others of his or her own "inviolate personality." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1, at 197, 205. Nevertheless, the law of criminal libel represented an earlier,
related reflection in the legal system of a perceived need for legal sanctions against the publication
of true information about private lives and personal relations to individuals.
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.... It is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether
the matter of it be true or false, since the provocation, and not the
falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally.64
Not only in colonial America,"5 but even after the ratification of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution and inclusion of sim-
ilar provisions in the various state constitutions,66 this law of criminal
libel retained remarkable vitality, particularly in the state courts.
67
During the nineteenth century, whether these criminal libel actions
violated constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press remained a
clouded issue, in part because of the unresolved controversy over the
Sedition Act of 1789.68 The Jeffersonians attacked the Sedition Act, a
federal statute embodying a modified version of common law criminal
libel, as a patently unconstitutional example of Federalist oppression.
But the Sedition Act expired under its own terms in 1801 before the
courts could make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality. Fifty
64. W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150-52 (1765) (reprinted
1966) (footnotes omitted).
65. In The Creation ofthe American Republic: 1776-1787, Gordon Wood explains the rather
quixotic application of criminal libel law in the Revolutionary War era:
In minds of most Whigs in 1776 individual rights, even the basic civil liberties (such as
freedom of the press) that we consider so crucial, possessed little of their modem theoret-
ical relevance when set against the will of the people. This is why, for example, through-
out the eighteenth century the Americans could contend for the broadest freedom of
speech against the magistracy, while at the same time punishing with a severe strictness
any seditious libels against the representatives of the people in the colonial assemblies.
Anyone who tried to speak against the interests of the people "should be held in execra-
tion. . . Every word, that tends to weaken the hands of the people is a crime of devilish
dye; indeed, it is the unpardonable Sin in politics." Thus it was 'no Loss of Liberty, that
court-minions can complain of, when they are silenced. No man has a right to say a
word, which may lame the liberties of his country." It was conceivable to protect the
common law liberties of the people themselves. "For who could be more free than the
People who representatively exercise supreme Power over themselves"?
G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 at 63 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
66. The first amendment and similar provisions in state constitutions were apparently origi-
nally intended to embody the Blackstonian notion that freedom of the press means freedom from
prior restraints, not freedom from liability for what has already been printed. See L. LEvy, supra
note 63, at 183-88. The correspondence between John Adams and Massachusetts Chief Justice
William Cushing in 1789, published in 27 MASS. L. QUAR. 12 (1942), substantiates this point.
It is interesting to note that, not content with damages or even criminal penalties for past
publications which interfered with the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis also argued for the
prior restraint of injunctive relief, without so much as a reference to traditional guarantees of
freedom of the press. They did specifically stipulate that in cases involving oral publications
where no special damages could be shown there should be no legal liability for interference with
the right to privacy "in the interest of free speech." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 217.
They never directly addressed, however, the issue of the other relevant first amendment freedom,
freedom of the press. Indirectly, their first proviso that "the right to privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest," id. at 214, would, as a practical
matter, give the news media some breathing room. This proviso is reflected in the newsworthiness
privilege currently applied as a limitation on damage actions both for invasions of privacy and for
defamation. See, eg., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,454-55 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 1143-46, 1148, 1152.
68. 1 Stat. 596. The Sedition Act differed from Blackstonian criminal libel in that it provided
for jury determination of law and fact and expressly provided for truth as an affirmative defense.
See W. CROSsKEY, 2 POLrrICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 767 (1953); L. LEvy, supra note 63, at
258-59, 292-93; J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 129-30 (1956).
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years later, Joseph Story expressed confidence in the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act.69 At midcentury, most jurists appear to have been,
like Story, reasonably confortable with the constitutionality of the fed-
eral Sedition Act in particular, and criminal libel in general.
Well into the nineteenth century, before statutory and common
law acceptance of truth as a defense in defamation actions, criminal
libel prosecutions for the publication of true private information flour-
ished in the state courts.7" Perhaps the most famous of these state crim-
inal libel actions was People v. Crosswell,71 brought by the State of New
York to vindicate the reputation of President Thomas Jefferson. In de-
ciding the appeal, Chancellor Kent held as a matter of common law
that proof of the truth of the libel alleged in that case ought to be re-
ceived as evidence tending to disprove the malicious intent necessary
for a finding of criminal liability by the jury.72 Kent's opinion is partic-
ularly interesting in relation to Warren's and Brandeis' later invention
69. [The Sedition Act's] constitutionality was deliberately affirmed by the courts of law,
and in a report made by a committee of congress. It was denied by a considerable
number of the states, but affirmed by a majority ....
[In a footnote to the text:]
It is well known, that the opinions then deliberately given by many professional men,
and judges, and legislatures, in favor of the constitutionality of the law, have never been
retracted.
J. STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 606 (2d ed. 1851). It
was not until over a century later in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), that
the United States Supreme Court declared that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1826), in which the court
foreshadowed Warren's and Brandeis' concern about violations of individual privacy:
No state of society would be more deplorable than that which would admit an indiscrim-
inate right in every citizen to arraign the conduct of every other, before the public, in
newspapers, handbills or other modes of publication, not only for crimes, but for faults,
foibles, deformities of mind or person, even admitting all such allegations to be true.
When the accusation is made by public bodies or officers whose duty it is by law to detect
and prosecute offenses, the charge and the investigation are submitted to, and no spirit of
revenge is produced; but if private intermeddlers, assuming the character of reformers,
should have the right to become public accusers, and when called to account, to defend
themselves by breaking into the circle of friends, families, children and domestics, to
prove the existence of errors or faults which may have been overlooked or forgiven
where they were most injurious, the man who is thus accused without lawful process
might be expected to avenge himself by unlawful means, and duels or assassinations
would be the common occurrences of the times. Instances are recollected where vio-
lence, and even death, has ensued from such proceedings. It was with a wise regard to
these evils, that the common law has put a check upon the licentiousness of the press, and
the expression of opinion by writing, painting, etc., when the effect and object is to black-
en the character of any one, or to disturb his comfort, the public good not being the end
and purpose of such publication, or if that is professed, the public peace requiring a
different mode of accusation.
Id. at 312-13 (emphasis in original). For the Massachusetts court in 1826 criminal libel was a
clearly available legal remedy for the very type of injuries Warren and Brandeis found 65 years
later to be unprotected except by the right to privacy.
71. 3 Johns. Cas. 336 (N.Y. 1804). An equally divided court refused to order a new trial to
consider evidence on the defense of truth, but before the case was submitted for judgment, the
New York legislature passed a statute establishing a statutory truth defense in criminal libel ac-
tions. 1805 N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 90, § 2. As a result, the court ordered a new trial. 3 Johns. Cas.
at 362, 413.
72. 3 Johns. Cas. at 377-79.
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of the right to privacy, because Kent insisted that "falsehood" was a
"material ingredient [only] in a public libel."73 In private libels, the
cases involving private individuals, which were Warren's and Brandeis'
primary concern, Kent insisted that "this doctrine [of truth as a de-
fense] will not go to tolerate libels upon private character, . . . or to
justify exposing to the public eye one's personal defects or misfor-
tunes."'74 When James Fenimore Cooper went to court to vindicate his
right to privacy against newspaper publicity in the 1830's and 1840's, he
naturally used this law of criminal libel."5
Even in civil libel actions brought by individuals to recover dam-
ages, the truth of the information disseminated was not a good defense
during much of the nineteenth century. As late as 1869, in an article
cited by Warren and Brandeis regarding the unauthorized circulation
of photographs, Judge Jameson suggested that, based in part on an
analogy to common law copyright," civil damages ought to be.
awarded for the publication of true likenesses under the law of libel:
As furnishing a cause of action in suits for damages, but one or two
cases occur to me. One would be, when a photograph clandestinely
taken, and representing its original in a ridiculous light, or publish-
ing his personal defects, should be uttered maliciously, to his dam-
age. Such a picture would doubtless be a libel in all our states, and
particularly in those in which the old maxim, "The greater the truth,
the greater the libel," is still in force.77
Gradually during the course of the nineteenth century, the various
states accepted the defense of truth in both civil and criminal libel
cases.78 As a result, by the time Warren and Brandeis wrote about the
right to privacy in 1890 they could accurately assert that publication of
true information was no longer actionable under the law of defama-
tion.79 As a result, by 1890 there was a vacuum, a type of injurious
73. Id. at 379.
74. Id. at 378 (emphasis supplied). Although not in the context of the truth defense, the
modem law of both privacy and defamation draws a similar distinction between "public figures"
and ordinary individuals. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91 (1967).
See Rosenberg, supra note 63, for a thorough discussion of the historical development of political
libeL
75. E.g., People v. Webb, I Hill 178 (N.Y. 1841). The United States Supreme Court finally
declared a state criminal libel statute unconstitutional in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77
(1964).
76. Warren and Brandeis suggested a similar analogy. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at
198-200. For a similar modem case, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 425
(1977. Jameson, The LegalRelations of Photographs, 8 AMER. LAW. REG. 1, 8 (1869).
78. The intricate historical interplay of statutory and case law regarding the defense of truth
in civil and criminal defamation actions in the various states is thoroughly explored in Franklin,
supra note 63. See also Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 1142-52.
79. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 218. Warren and Brandeis were undoubtedly influ-
enced by Justice Morton's opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Perry v.
Porter, 124 Mass. 338 (1878), decided in April of the year Warren and Brandeis graduated from
1979]
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conduct (unconsented publication of true personal information) for
which the law provided no remedy. Warren and Brandeis designed the
right to privacy to fill this vacuum by providing legal grounds for indi-
viduals victimized by the unconsented publication of true personal in-
formation to sue the publishers."0
Although the right to privacy'shared with criminal libel and civil
defamation a concern about harm caused by newspaper publicity, War-
ren and Brandeis did not conceive of the right to privacy as a reincar-
nation of criminal libel designed to protect the public order from
harmful newspaper publicity."1 Nor did they conceive of the right to
privacy as an extension of the civil law of defamation designed to pro-
tect the individual's reputation from false publicity.82 Rather they in-
vented a new concept which would protect a different and otherwise
unprotected legal interest-the individual's control over his or her own
personality.
This distinctive legal interest was, Warren and Brandeis argued,
an important aspect of the individual's basic right to life itself. But it
was not grounds to enforce an absolute ban on all newspaper publicity
about all individual's private lives. In fact, Warren and Brandeis ex-
pressly called for what they termed "an elasticity," or sliding-scale, im-
position of liability for invasion of privacy:
To publish of a modest and retiring individual that he suffers from
an impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell correctly, is an
unwarranted, if not an unexampled, infringement of his rights, while
to state and comment on the same characteristics found in a would-
be congressman could not be regarded as beyond the pale of propri-
ety .... Some things all men alike are entitled to keep from popular
the Harvard Law School. The court interpreted Massachusetts statutory law: "The provisions
that the truth may be given in evidence, and if proved shall be a sufficient justification, undoubt-
edly were intended to apply to civil and criminal proceedings." Id. at 341-42.
80. In modem tort law, invasion of privacy is customarily distinguished from defamation in
that the latter refers only to publication of false assertions about an individual. Professor Freund,
supra note 22, at 188, suggests a number of reasons for the non-incorporation of the right to
privacy into the law of defamation. Probably the most important of these reasons is the preserva-
tion of the defense of truth in defamation actions.
81. Warren and Brandeis did, however, suggest that a separate and distinct criminal invasion
of privacy statute might be enacted. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 219.
82. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis took great pains to underscore several distinctions between
the right to privacy and the law of defamation. In addition to noting that the law of libel and
slander applied "merely to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life," Warren and Brandeis
emphasized that there were even more fundamental differences between defamation law and the
right to privacy. Id. at 218 (emphasis supplied).
Libel and slander actions are "in their nature material rather than spiritual" actions vindicat-
ing the right to privacy. Id. at 197. In addition, Warren and Brandeis insisted that "[tihe principle
on which the law of defamation rests, covers ... a radically different class of effects from" those
covered by the right to privacy. Id. Defamation "deals only with damage to reputation, with the
injury done to the individual m his external relations with the community, by lowering him in the
estimation of his fellows." Id. Warren and Brandeis contrasted this external focus of defamation
with the right to privacy's interior focus on "the effect of the publication upon [the individual's]
estimate of himself and upon his own feelings." Id.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Ariz. L. Rev.  16 1979
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
curiosity, whether in public life or not, while others are only private
because the persons concerned have not assumed a position which
makes their doings legitimate matters of public investigation. 83
The right to privacy was, they argued, an already existing common law
principle which provided a proper basis for recognizing in each indi-
vidual not absolute dominion, but some measure of control over the
extent to which newspapers and others disseminated personal informa-
tion about that individual.
THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC DISTINCTION
In inventing a legal theory for protecting the right to privacy, War-
ren and Brandeis presupposed that there was something ascertainably
"private" to protect from being made "public." 4 In fact, they appear
to have envisaged a private sphere of personal matters almost literally
and physically set off from matters of public concern. They even de-
scribed interferences with the right to privacy in spacial terms: News-
papers were "overstepping the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency,"'85 into the private lives of individuals; such "intrusion upon
the domestic circle" threatened to make the Biblical "prediction that
what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops" a reality. 6 The right to privacy's function was to prevent the
public from encroaching on and eventually swallowing up private mat-
ters. At stake, Warren and Brandeis argued, was not just the private-
public distinction itself, but the very personality and innermost feelings
of the individual.
This aspect of Warren's and Brandeis' argument reflected a long-
standing assumption on the part of social, political, and legal commen-
tators that there was a clear line of demarcation between the private
and the public. For them, what was private related solely to the indi-
vidual. What was public related to the community or society at large.
This sharp distinction between a category of things private and a cate-
gory of things public had been part of Anglo-American social and in-
tellectual tradition in colonial America" and well into the nineteenth
83. Id. at 215-16.
84. Id. at 198-99. In discussing legal enforcement of the right to privacy, this private-public
distinction can become something of a semantic puzzle. Interferences with individual privacy can
be "private" interferences (i e., by other individuals) or "public" interferences (ie., by the govern-
ment). Warren and Brandeis contemplated both types. Id. at 220. Likewise, enforcement of an
individual's right to privacy can be vindicated through "private" actions brought by the individual
(e.g., in tort) or through "public" actions brought by the government (e.g., criminal prosecutions).
Warren and Brandeis argued for both means of enforcement. Id. at 219.
85. Id. at 196.
86. Id. at 195-96.
87. In his comparative study of privacy in colonial New England, David Flaherty concluded,
"[tihe New England Colonists' desire for personal privacy was not a novel demand in the New
World but a part of their traditional English heritage. The residents of colonial New England
1979]
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century. For example, in 1838 James Fenimore Cooper described
"[t]he duties of station," or the roles of individuals, as "divided into
those of political or public station, and those of social, or private sta-
tion. They are not necessarily connected, and shall be considered sepa-
rately."88
Eighteenth and early nineteenth century legal scholars such as
Blackstone89 and Kent9" also assumed such a clear distinction between
private and public categories of law. In his Commentaries on the Laws
of England, first published in 1765, Blackstone divided the law along
private-public lines: "Wrongs also are divisible into first, private
wrongs, which, being an infringement merely of particular rights, con-
cemr individuals only, and are called civil injuries; and secondly, public
wrongs, which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the
whole community, and are called crimes and misdemeanors."9 1 Black-
stone's division was commonplace among American legal commenta-
tors who routinely designated as "private" matters associated with the
individual.92 They carefully separated such private matters from pub-
lic matters, which related to the government or to the wider commu-
nity. The law treated each of these categories separately.
By the middle of the nineteenth century the precise nature of and
criteria for this distinction between private and public legal categories
appears to have become a matter of doubt, or at least debate. In En-
gland, John Austin devoted one of his Lectures on Jurisprudence to the
subject "Law, Public and Private. ' 93 Specifically approving Black-
stone's private-public categorization,94 Austin discussed at length the
Roman law distinction between juspublicum and jusprivatum, which
he said was "the model or pattern upon which the modem distinctions
into public and private law have all of them been formed."95 He also
pointed out that the civilians and German legal writers similarly in-
sisted on differentiating between private and public law. But Austin
valued privacy." D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 242 (1972). From the
architecture, literature, legislation, religious and social customs, public records, and contemporary
accounts of life in the New England colonies, Flaherty demonstrates that the North American
colonists were in fact concerned about keeping certain aspects of their lives private, :e., away from
the eyes, ears, and minds of the rest of society. Id. at 5-9, 248.
88. J. COOPER, supra note 60, at 140.
89. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at 118.
90. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826).
91. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at 118 (emphasis in original).
92. See, eg., Thomas Cooley's designation of "private wrongs" as those "specially and pecu-
liarly injurious to an individual." T. COOLEY, supra note 13, at 7.
93. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 770-87 (3d ed. 1869) (Robert Campbell, ed.,
based on notes taken by John Stewart Mill). Austin was primarily concerned about the conun-
drum of where to place "public law," relating to the sovereign and his political subordinates, in
the organically related whole of the corpus juris. He argued that the "public law" should be a
subcategory under the law of persons. Id. at 771.
94. Id. at 777.
95. Id.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Ariz. L. Rev.  18 1979
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
complained that mid-nineteenth century English jurisprudence failed
to define clearly the criteria for distinguishing between public law and
private law: "Every part of the law is in a certain sense public and
every part of it is in a certain sense private also. . . .Nothing can be
more varying than the views taken by some modem writers of the dis-
tinction between public and private law."96 The Warren and Brandeis
argument for the right to privacy thus reflected a long jurisprudential
tradition which distinguished private from public on the basis of
whether the individual or the society at large were involved. Moreover,
their argument also reflected a more recently perceived uncertainty
about how to separate private from public.
Legal writers were not the only nineteenth century commentators
on the precariousness of the private-public distinction whose views are
reflected in Warren's and Brandeis' argument for the right to privacy.
As early as 1838 James Fenimore Cooper complained, "[t]here is get-
ting to be so much public right, that private right is overshadowed and
lost." 97 In arguing for a sharp delineation between the duties of public
station and the duties of private station, Cooper denounced as "another
form of oppression practiced by the public, [the public's] arrogating to
itself a right to inquire into, and to decide on the private acts of individ-
uals, beyond the cognizance of the laws."'98 Later in the nineteenth
century, Henry James dramatized the social and psychological dangers
posed when publicity threatens to swallow up individual privacy. In
the five years immediately preceding the Warren and Brandeis article,
.Henry James published two controversial novels, The Bostonians99 and
he Reverberator,l° both of which focused on the ways in which pub-
96. Id. at 776, 780.
97. J. COOPER, supra note 60, at 229.
98. Id. at 198.
99. THE BOSTONIANS, supra note 54, even began with the presentation of two contrasting
views of privacy: The Bostonian lady was concerned about an "organized privacy. . . so many
objects that spoke of habits and tastes." .d. at 16. On the other hand, "privacy," for the young
lawyer from Mississippi, "consisted entirely in what he called 'laying off."' Id. at 18. Announc-
ing that he was focusing his sharp novelist's eye on the intimate details of the "interiors" of his
characters, James portrayed in vivid detail the warping influence of publicity. Id. at 16. For
example, when the young male lawyer proposed to the female inspirational speaker, he told her
that until the RationalReview agreed to publish one of his essays, "It didn't seem to me at all clear
that there was a place for me in the world." Id. at 380. Once he was to be published, the lawyer
suddenly became ready to enter into the private world of matrimony. In an example of James'
masterfuil use of the double entendre, the lawyer commented to the woman speaker regarding his
about-to-be published essay, "[t]his will seem pitiful to you no doubt, who publish yourself." Id.
at 379. James presented the inspirational speaker as almost literally publishing herself, as if she
were a newspaper article, by making public speeches about her personal views of women's rights.
In the end, the lawyer literally took her away from the public, in the form of a large, impatient
audience, into the privacy of marriage.
100. THE REVEREERATOR, supra note 55, was a short novel based on actual observation in
Europe. It was a story of classic Jamesian confrontation between American innocence and Old
World experience. A naive, young American woman was accepted into the private lives of Euro-
pean society. She then inadvertently caused the most private details of these private lives to be
published in an American newspaper, thereby deeply offending the sensibilities of a European
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licity could infect and even destroy the intimacies of private life.
Many causes undoubtedly contributed to the late nineteenth cen-
tury's concern about the breakdown of the private-public distinction.' 0 1
Warren and Brandeis specifically mentioned technological progress-
"modem enterprise and invention"° 2-- as well as the pressures of "ad-
vancing civilization."' 3 But there were, in addition, a variety of less
tangible causes, including the series of religious revival movements
which, as they repeatedly swept across nineteenth century America,
gathered up private and public life together in great waves of religious
"enthusiasm."1 "° As the inner and the outer person, the law and reli-
gion, the public and the private all began to be postulated as parts of a
world dominated by publicly proclaimed, all-embracing, spiritual be-
lief, jurists and novelists alike began to complain that this kind of pub-
lic morality was threatening to obliterate the private life of the
individual. 05 By the 1890's these forces, together with the rise of an
ever more widely distributed sensationalist press, and compounded by
population increases and technological inventions, threatened the pub-
lic-private distinction with obliteration. The private realm of the indi-
family, the Proberts. James took pains to set off the Proberts' "worship of privacy and good
manners," against the young American's delight at the thought of appearing in the newspapers.
Id. at 127, 203. The article, which to the young American was "scanty,-it was 'skimpy'," was, to
the ultra-privacy-sensitive Proberts, "two horrible columns of vulgar lies and scandal about our
family,. . . about all our affairs," a veritable "flood of impudence" which wreaked havoc on their
sensibilities. Id. at 142, 165, 197. Old Mr. Probert "seemed ten years older" after the newspaper
revelations'of details of his family's private life. Id. at 148. James even described the Proberts'
consideration of legal vindication of-their privacy under that "Loi Relative a la Presse, I 1 Mai
1868" which Warren and Brandeis cite as precedent for the right to privacy. Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 1, at 214, n.1.
101. For expression of this concern, see The Testfor Privacy and Publicity, supra note 56;
Godkin, supra note 12. In The Rise of Silas Lapham William Dean Howells presented as among
the fatal flaws of the nouveau riche entrepreneur, Silas Lapham's virtually complete failure to
distinguish between his public and his private life. For example, Lapham proudly boasted to a
newspaper reporter that he named his most deluxe line of paints "Persis" after his wife, and
brought it out on her birthday. W. HOWELLS, THE RISE OF SILAS LAPHAM (1885).
102. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
103. Id.
104. Perry Miller describes the nature of such revivals:
According to Colton, the Revival had gotten so far out of hand that. . . churches had
become plague spots of "meddling, tattling, slander, scandal.". . . As Samuel Chapin
said in 1829, "the instructor injurisprudence teaches his pupils not merely rules of proce-
dure but the basic principle that civil society is an ordinance of heaven. . ." it is not a
combination simply for the protection of life and property; but it is an association for
moral improvement.
P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 29,
190 (1965).
105. Cooper, among others, explicitly attributed the loss of "private right" in the United States
in part to "the religious discipline that so much influenced the colonists .... In communities in
which private acts became the subject of public parochial investigation, it followed as a natural
consequence, that men lived under the constant corrective of public opinion, however narrow,
provincial, or prejudiced." J. COOPER, supra note 60, at 229-30. Cooper saw the privacy problem
in the late 1830's as in part the result of totalitarian religious fanaticism and in part the natural
consequence of the democratic insistance on the overriding rule and rights of the majority, !e., the
public, over the individual. Id. at 129-31, 229-30.
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vidual literally appeared to be in danger of being swallowed up by the
public.
At a time when the conventional line between what was public and
what was private appeared to be wavering and uncertain, Warren and
Brandeis suggested a simple solution. Since what was private was char-
acterized by its close connection with the individual, it was, they ar-
gued, peculiarly appropriate for the individual to decide which matters
relating to that individual would be considered private and which were
in the public domain." 6 The right to privacy simply offered legal en-
forcement for such individual decisions regarding the communication
of information about that individual's private life.
Warren and Brandeis insisted that the courts already had long ex-
perience in enforcing such individual decisions separating public from
private matters.107 In support of this assertion they cited cases from a
bewildering variety of traditional legal areas, such as property, nui-
sance, defamation, common law copyright, the equitable right to pre-
vent publication of the contents of letters, contracts, trusts, the law of
trade secrets, and common law protection against eavesdropping. They
concluded that, "[tihe cases referred to above show that the common
law has for a century and a half protected privacy in certain cases, and
to grant the further protection now suggested would be merely another
application of an existing rule."' 0 They conceded that this right to
privacy was not an absolute right. Rather it operated as a presumption
of individual self-determination. Each individual should decide for
himself or herself which aspects of his or her personal life would be
private, kept away from the public concerns of the wider community,
and the law should enforce that decision unless there was a good reason
not to do so.
INDIVIDUALISM
With its emphasis on the prerogatives of the individual as against
those of the wider community, the right to privacy was an unmistaka-
ble part of the long tradition of American individualism. Simply on a
106. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198-99 & n.2.
107. Id. at 198-99. The most important of the cases relied upon by Warren and Brandeis as
already vindicating this private-public distinction was Prince Albert v. Strange, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171
(Ch. 1849). This English case involved an injunction against the publication of certain etchings
made by the Prince Consort and Queen Victoria for the royal family and their friends. At trial,
Vice-Chancellor Bruce suggested propriety as the legally enforceable line of demarcation between
what is properly private and what is properly public; he enforced this distinction as a property
right. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGrex & Sm. 652, 697 (1849) (opinion of Knight Bruce, V.C. at
trial). What Warren and Brandeis did in their article three decades later was to draw out of this
and the many other cases they cited a legal dividing line between what is properly private and
what can be made public-the principle of the individual's "inviolate personality," the right to
decide for oneself. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
108. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 213 n.1.
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linguistic level, "individual" runs like a leit motif throughout the War-
ren and Brandeis article. The Right to Privacy opens with the individ-
ual in central focus: "That the individual shall have full protection in
person and in property is a principle as old as the common law."10 9 It
similarly concludes by focusing on an image of the embattled individ-
ual and warning: "Still, the protection of society must come mainly
through a recognition of the rights of the individual."''10 In between,
the article develops Warren's and Brandeis' basic premise that "[t]he
common law secures to each individual the right to determining, ordi-
narily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others."' 11 Deeply rooted in the nineteenth century's
classical liberal tradition of individual rights," 2 Warren and Brandeis
saw the individual as the basic unit of society. They shared Thomas
Cooley's conviction that "[t]he maximum of a benefit of which govern-
ment is capable is attained when individual rights are clearly and accu-
rately defined by impartial laws, which impose on no one any greater
restraint than is found essential for securing equivalent rights to all
others."" 3
The relationships between Warren's and Brandeis' right to privacy
and individualism are complicated by their conception of the right to
privacy as both an important attribute of, as well as a vital protection
for, individualism. It is useful to examine these two aspects separately.
As an essential attribute of individualism, the right to privacy was for
Warren and Brandeis simply part of what it meant to be an individual.
To state this relationship in another way, individualism was defined in
part by individual self-control, which included the individual's capacity
to keep some matters "private," i e., under the individual's own control,
beyond the reach of the rest of the community. 1 4 To the extent that
such private matters as a person's "thoughts, sentiments and emotions
• . . personal appearance, sayings, acts, and. . . personal relation[s],
domestic or otherwise," were taken from the individual's control and
109. Id. at 193 (emphasis supplied).
110. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis supplied).
111. Id. at 198.
112. Many of these late nineteenth century views about individual rights reflected the popular
arguments of the influential British philosopher John Stuart Mill. For example, the notion of an
individual's right to be let alone echoes the first maxim of Mil's essay On LiberlnX "that the
individual is not accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the interests of no
person but himself. ... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 10, 95 (Appleton-Century-Crofts ed. 1947) (1st ed. 1859).
113. T. COOLEY, supra note 12, at 6. See also J. STORY, supra note 69, at 600 passim.
114. Some specific examples of what Warren and Brandeis considered to be private matters
include "details of sexual relations" and such a "domestic occurrence" as a man's recording "in a
letter to his son, or in his diary, that he did not dine with his wife on a certain day." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196, 201. They also argued that "to publish of a modest and retiring
individual that he suffers from an impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell correctly"
would be an infringement of his right to privacy. Id. at 215.
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involuntarily given over to society (as by newspaper publication), that
person's individualism was diminished. 115
This aspect of Warren's and Brandeis' conception of the right to
privacy as an essential attribute of individualism reaches back to the
tradition of natural, inherent individual rights predating and superior
to the legal and political system. Two hundred years earlier, Locke had
postulated that the "lives, liberties and estates" of individuals were, as a
matter of fundamental natural law, a private preserve, almost literally
walled off from public interference.1 6 Within this private domain,
each individual retained absolute rights against outside interferences.
A century later, Blackstone reflected this natural rights tradition when
he declared that there is a "residuum of natural liberty," which includes
certain "absolute rights of individuals . . . such as would belong to
their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is enti-
tled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it.""' 7
Warren and Brandeis conceived the right of privacy as one of
these natural, fundamental rights which made up part of an individ-
ual's basic individualism. But the right to privacy also had another
aspect. It had a practical operative function as legal protection for the
individualism of which it was a part. Warren and Brandeis argued that
the legal right of privacy afforded a theoretical basis for securing a vari-
ety of legal remedies (including tort damages, injunctive relief, and
statutory criminal prosecutions) which would punish and/or prevent
interferences with an individuars control over personal information.18
The relationship between the right to privacy as a means for practical
legal enforcement of individual control over personal information and
115. Id. at 198, 213. This belief that control over personal information was an essential attri-
bute of individual personality, what we would today call individuality, appears to have been
widely shared at the time the Warren and Brandeis article was written. An interesting example of
this concern is found in an editorial in the Andover Review. "The plea made in excuse for such
revelations [of diaries and private correspondence] is that the public has a right to all available
knowledge of the man,. . . But not to such knowledge as desecrates the personality. ... The
Confidence of the Dead, 3 ANDOVER REviEw 275, 278 (1885).
116. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 71 passim (Liberal Arts Press ed.
1952) (1st ed. 1690).
117. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at 119, 125 (emphasis in original). According to Black-
stone, these "absolute tights which were vested in [individuals] by the immutable laws of nature,"
were divided into rights of "personal security," "personal liberty," and "property." Id. at 124-34.
The "right of personal security" involved "a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his
life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." d. at 125. This is the right which Cooley
denominated the "right to be let alone," which in turn formed part of the basis for Warren's and
Brandeis' right to privacy. The right of "personal liberty" involved "the power of loco-motion, of
changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may di-
rect; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." Id. at 130. The right of
"property" involved "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any
control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land." Id. at 134. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution echoed similar
natural rights postulates.
118. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219.
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the right to privacy as descriptive of an inherent part of individualism
was expressly circular; the right to privacy was both means and end.
Warren and Brandeis justified legal enforcement of the right to privacy
on the basis that one of the natural attributes of being an individual
was the ability to control the extent to which one's thoughts, senti-
ments, emotions and the like are communicated to others.119 At the
same time, legal enforcement of the right to privacy also operated as a
practical means by which an individual could exercise his or her inher-
ent right of individual self-determination. 2
A related, additional, interdependent duality built into Warren's
and Brandeis' conception of the right to privacy is illuminated by the
modem analytic distinction between individuals' positive freedom-to
and negative freedom-from. 2 ' Expressly related to the individual's
"right to be let alone," the right to privacy involved the exercise of a
kind of negative freedom from outside interference. 22 In particular,
Warren and Brandeis were concerned about freedom from a specific
type of interference: not physical interference, but psychological or
"spiritual" interference with individual personality caused by the un-
consented to collection and publication of personal information. How-
ever, this negative freedom aspect of the right to privacy was not simply
an end in itself. It was also a means by which the individual could
foster and maintain another, positive freedom aspect of the right to pri-
vacy: the individual's capacity affirmatively to control his or her own
life and personality, in part by controlling information about his or her
private life."2 Warren and Brandeis argued that legal enforcement of
the right to privacy reinforced the individual's positive "power to fix
the limits of the publicity which shall be given" to that individual's
personal attributes and attitudes. 24 This positive freedom assertion of
the right to privacy was, they argued, essential to that aspect of individ-
ualism which involved the individual's affirmative capacity for self-de-
termination, autonomy, and human dignity. Having the right to
privacy was, they argued, a necessary precondition for "robustness of
thought and delicacy of feeling . . . enthusiasm . . . generous im-
pulse,"' or in larger terms, "the conduct of a noble life."' 26 Legal
enforcement of the right to privacy was ultimately valuable and impor-
119. Id. at 214.
120. Id. at 219-20.
121. See I. BERLIN, supra note 9, at 7-19.
122. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
123. See Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 1000-07 (1964); Fried, supra note 9, at 482-86; Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy,
74 COLuM. L. REv. 1410, 1414-16passim (1974).
124. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
125. Id. at 196.
126. Id. at 207.
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tant to Warren and Brandeis because it empowered the individual posi-
tively to assert control over his or her own personality, to share it with
others as the individual chose.12 7
Warren's and Brandeis' insistance on self-determination as an ex-
ercise of and means to attain and to protect individual freedom re-
flected the traditional American emphasis on spiritual independence
and self-reliance associated with Emerson, Thoreau, Dickenson, and
many other nineteenth century American writers. Theirs was a social
and psychological tradition concerned about introspection and soli-
tude, as well as interpersonal relationships. Viewed by its inventors as
an important safeguard for the individual's control over his or her spir-
itual development and intimate relationships with others, the right to
privacy fits within this tradition and perhaps only makes sense within
that context.
Emphasis on the need to cultivate and to protect individual spiri-
tual life reached back at least as far as the establishment of the North
American colonies, settled mostly by Protestants asserting private, indi-
vidual judgment in such matters as conscience, religion, life-style, and
the like.128 The notion that the basic integrity of the individual re-
quired a private sphere in which the individual would be let alone by
the public was a classic literary and philosophical theme in America
throughout the nineteenth century. The most influential exponent of
this aspect of nineteenth century American individualism was Ralph
Waldo Emerson, who had a particularly strong influence on Brandeis
as a young man. 29 Emerson's view of individualism insisted on the
integrity and self-definition of each individual. 3 ° In order to achieve
127. See Fried, supra note 9, at 483.
128. Bernard Bailyn explained that pre-revolutionary Americans tended to see a two-sided
world "divided into distinct, contrasting and inately antagonistic spheres: the [public] sphere of
power and the [private] sphere of [individual] liberty or iight. The one was brutal, ceaselessly
active and heedless; the other was delicate, passive and sensitive." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 57-58 (1967). Warren and Brandeis designed the right
to privacy to protect this latter, private sphere of individual liberty from being submerged by the
realm of public power.
129. According to Mason, during Brandeis' years as a student at the Harvard Law School
(1875-1878) Emerson was Brandeis' favorite author. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 39. Among the
numerous passages from Emerson's writings in Brandeis' notebook were such aphorisms as, "[i]t is
easy in the world to live after the world's opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but
the great man is he who in the midst of a crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the independence of
solitude." Id. at 38-39. This passage clearly foreshadows Brandeis' emphasis on "social privacy"
in his later article with his law partner, Sam Warren. See also LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS,
supra note 29, at 303.
130. In his famous Phi Beta Kappa address on "The American Scholar," in 1837, Emerson
commented:
[A] sign of our times, also marked with an analogous political movement, is the new
importance given to the single person. Everything that tends to insulate the individual-
to surround him with barriers of natural respect, so that each man shall feel the world is
his, and man shall treat with man as a sovereign state with a sovereign state--tends to
true union as well as greatness.
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and to maintain individual integrity, Emerson suggested self-cultiva-
tion of individualism through being "self-relying and self-directed."' 
Half a century later, Warren and Brandeis added to self-reliance the
legal enforcement of the right to privacy, as both a protection for and
an exercise of Emersonian individualism.
The Emersonian tradition of individualism relied heavily on "soli-
tude" as essential for cultivation of individualism; Emerson rarely
mentioned privacy. Warren and Brandeis, however, called for both
"solitude and privacy" as "essential to the individual."' 132 The relation-
ship between solitude and privacy is important in clearly understand-
ing Warren's and Brandeis' original conception of the right to privacy.
For Warren and Brandeis solitude and privacy were related, but not
identical, qualities of individualism. Solitude described the individ-
ual's state of being either voluntarily or involuntarily alone, without
the presence of other individuals. Privacy was often a more social state
in which the individual was with only those other persons whom that
individual had voluntarily chosen. 3 3 Only if the individual chose to be
R. EMERSON, The American Scholar, in NATURE ADDRESSES AND LECTURES 112-13 (Riverside
ed. 1890). Toward the end of the address Emerson asked rhetorically.
Is it not the chief disgrace in the world, not to be an unit;-not to be reckoned one
character,-not to yield that peculiar fruit which each man was created to bear, but to be
reckoned in the gross, in the hundred or the thousand, of the party, the section, to which
we belong. ...
Id. at 114.
131. Id. at 101-02. Emerson further elaborated on this recommendation in his essay on self-
reliance in 1841: "Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its
members... . What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think.. . . Insist on
yourself, never imitate .... Nothing can bring you peace but yourself." R. EMERSON, Sef-Reli-
ance, in ESSAYS 35, 38, 60-61, 62 (Apollo ed. 1961).
132. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. This association of privacy with solitude
echoed a convention reaching back at least to the establishment of the colonies. For example, in
his essay Some Fruits of Solitude, widely circulated in the American colonies beginning in the
1690's, William Penn had included:
"Privacy"
325. Remember the Proverb, Bene Qui Latuit, Bene Vixit, They are happy that live
retiredly.
326. If this be true, princes and their grandees, of all men, are the unhappiest; for they
live least alone ....
Quoted in Flaherty, supra note 87, at 13. By the time of the American Revolution, solitude had
become associated not only with privacy but with American independence itself. On a monument
to the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1776 appeared these words: "FAIR LIBERTY thou lovely Goddess
here. Have we not woo d thee, won thee long. . . and led thee smiling to this SOLITUDE." "A
view of the Obelisk Erected Under Liberty Tree in Boston on the Rejoicings for the Repeal of the
Stamp Act," line engraving by Paul Revere (1766), in the archives of the Boston Athenaeum.
133. Dickenson expressed this distinction between solitude and privacy poetically:
There is a solitude of space
A solitude of sea
A solitude of death, but these
Society shall be
compared with that profounder site
That polar privacy
A soul admitted to itself-
Finite infinity.
THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKENSON 691 (Johnson ed. 1960) (1st ed. 1914). In this poem
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with no other persons would privacy and solitude coincide. Emily
Dickenson captured this crucial element of individual choice in a poem
published in Boston just a month before Warren and Brandeis pub-
lished The Right to Privacy:
The soul selects her own society
Then shuts the door,
On her divine majority
Obtrude no more. 134
Insistence on the unfettered discretion of each individual to choose his
or her own circle of intimacy and then to close the door to outside
interference was precisely the essence of Warren's and Brandeis' con-
ception of the right to privacy.135
Warren and Brandeis recognized that the individual choice to
share one's personality only with selected other individuals could be
exercised by following the example of Thoreau 36 who went out to
Walden Pond, a "vast range and circuit, some square miles of unfre-
quented forest, for my privacy, abandoned to me by men."'' 37 Walden
afforded Thoreau a vital opportunity to discover and to cultivate his
own individuality away from the reports and opinions of the rest of
society. As an additional and more practical alternative to Thoreau's
voluntary solitude, Warren and Brandeis suggested that the legal right
to privacy was a means to protect individualism against "the complex-
ity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization."' 138 This right to pri-
vacy had the added advantage of allowing the individual to protect his
or her "inviolate personality" while continuing o live in society. In
Society and Solitude Emerson had warned, "[s]olitude is impracticable,
and society fatal."'' 39 What was needed was a pragmatic balance.
Twenty years later, Warren and Brandeis argued that the right to pri-
Dickenson's view appears to be that an individual had solitude when he or she was alone; but
privacy was achieved only when the individual had voluntarily excluded all individuals except
erself or himself. Warren's and Brandeis' view of social privacy was wider in that it assumed
that individuals would choose to include selected others. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196,
201, 207, 213.
134. POEMS BY EMILY DICKENSON (1890), quotedin EMILY DICKENSON 17-18 (J.M. Brinnen
ed. 1960).
135. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 220. The poet and the legal writers even shared the
common metaphor of the individual protecting the private sphere by shutting the door against
intrusion. The critical factor for both the poet and the lawyers was individual choice whether and
on what terms to allow access to individual and personal information.
136. Thoreau created the image which has come virtually to stand for individualism: "If a
man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer.
Let him step to the music which he hears, however measured or far away." H. THOREAU,
WALDEN 215 (Norton Critical ed. 1966). In a sense, what Warren and Brandeis did in their 1890
law review article was to outline some legal remedies which would vindicate the right of each
individual marcher to follow his different drummer in privacy, untrammeled by societal comment.
137. H. THOREAU, supra note 136, at 87.
138. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196. Brandeis later termed this protection for indi-
vidualism "social privacy." LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra note 29, at 303.
139. R. EMERSON, SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE 20 (Riverside ed. 1870).
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vacy afforded just such a balance between society and solitude, by af-
fording individuals the means to control themselves and the
communication of their personal lives and attributes to the rest of soci-
ety without seceding from that society.
LIMITED GOVERNMENT
Although it was almost forty years before Brandeis discussed in
detail the operation of the right to privacy to protect the individual
from the "constituted authority" of the government, 40 his original con-
ception of the right to privacy clearly contemplated such an applica-
tion. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis extrapolated from what they
assumed were already accepted privacy protections against interference
by the government, the legitimacy of enforcing the right to privacy
against interferences by newspaper reporters and other nongovernmen-
tal purveyors of personal information: "The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its
own officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the
courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open
wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?"'141 Warren and Bran-
deis saw the right to privacy as facing in two directions to ward off both
governmental and nongovernmental interferences with the individual's
decisions about what aspects of his or her personality would be made
public or kept private.
Warren's and Brandeis' vision of a two-sided legal protection for
the individual's private sphere reflected the views of most nineteenth
century legal writers. For example, in 1826 Chancellor Kent had de-
scribed the right to personal security as protecting the individual both
from the government and from other individuals. 142 In discussing the
law of "unlawful searches, etc." in his Treatise on the Law of Torts,
Thomas Cooley typically insisted that the individual had a right to pro-
tection against both governmental and nongovernmental invasions of
privacy:
In their origin these provisions had in view the mischiefs of such op-
pressive action by the government or its officers, as the seizing of
140. Olimstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
141. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 220.
142. Kent wrote:
While the personal security of every citizen is protected from lawless violence by the arm
of government and the terrors of the penal code, and while it is equally guarded from
unjust and tyrannical proceedings on the part of the government itself, by the provisions
to which we have referred, every person is also entitled to the preventive arm of the
magistrate, as a further protection from threatened or impending danger, and, on reason-
able cause being shown, he may require his adversary to be bound to keep the peace.
J. KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 15-16 (12th ed. O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed. 1873) (1st
ed. 1826).
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papers to obtain the evidence of intended crimes; but their protection
goes much beyond such cases; it justly assumes that a man may have
secrets of business, of friendship, or of more tender sentiments, to
which his books, papers, or letters may bear testimony, but with
which the public have no concern; that he may even have secrets of
shame which are so exclusively his own concern that others have no
right to pry into or to discuss them. 1
43
Aside from such general comments, for the most part nineteenth cen-
tury legal scholars tended to discuss separately, often in separate trea-
tises,1" the operation of the right to privacy against governmental
interferences on the one hand, and against non-governmental interfer-
ences on the other.
Up until Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy,
most of the legal discussion had focused on the individual's right to
privacy as a limitation on governmental interferences with individual
freedom. At the time the Constitution was adopted, Hamiltonian no-
tions of limited government held that there was no need to expressly
forbid governmental invasions of individual rights such as privacy, be-
cause the government had not been given the power to invade individ-
ual privacy. 145 During the first half of the nineteenth century, legal
writers generally relied on these notions of inherent limitations on gov-
ernment power as the primary protection against governmental inva-
sions of individual privacy." By midcentury, however, writers had
begun to devote substantial portions of their constitutional law treatises
to the Bill of Right's specific protections for individual privacy.1 47 For
example, in his Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Cooley focused
143. T. COOLEY, supra note 13, at 294. In his treatise on constitutional limitations, Cooley
similarl argued that the individual's right to privacy against government interference could be
extrapolate from the general right of "every man under the protection of the law [to] close the
door of his habitation, and defend his privacy in it. . . against private individuals." T. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 210 (1868).
144. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, supra notes 12 & 13; J. STORY, supra note 69.
145. In the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton expressed the widely shared notion that
individuals' rights were independent of the Constitution under which "in strictness the people
surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations" of
private rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 439 (A. Hamilton) (Everyman's Library ed. 1971).
146. Typically, these writers would only secondarily refer to the various more specific limita-
tions on government imposed by the Bill of Rights, almost as if these guarantees were fail-safe
protections. For example, Justice Joseph Story leaned heavily on Hamiltonian notions of a gov-
ernment of express, limited powers:
In our country, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every thing,
they have no need of particular reservations. "We, the people of the United States, to
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
constitution for the United States of America"--is a better recognition of popular rights,
then volumes of those aphorisms which make a principal figure in several of our state
bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics, than in a
constitution of government
J. STORY, supra note 69, at 585 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 84) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
147. See, e.g., F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVERNMENT (1853); 2 J. KENT,
supra note 142.
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specifically on third, fourth, and fifth amendment protections for indi-
vidual privacy.'48 He even suggested a privacy hinge joining the fourth
and fifth amendments: "it is not allowable to invade one's privacy for
the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him."1
49
In 1888, just two years before Warren and Brandeis published The
Right to Privacy, the United States Supreme Court expressly adopted
Cooley's analysis of direct fourth and fifth amendment protections
against governmental invasions of individual privacy. In Boyd v.
United States,5 ' Judge Bradley ruled:
[T]he very essence of constitutional liberty and security [is affected
by] all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that consti-
tfltes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefea-
sible right of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty .... 151
Although Warren and Brandeis did not directly refer to Boyd v. United
States, their argument presupposed Boyd's ruling that the government
was constrained to respect "the sanctity of a man's home and the priva-
cies of life." '52 They simply argued that nongovernmental interfer-
ences such as the "idle or prurient curiosity" of other persons,
especially the newspapers, are similarly proscribed. 153 What the law
protected in both types of cases was the "general right to privacy"
which embodied each individual's "right of determining, ordinarily, to
148. T. COOLEY, supra note 143, at 578.
149. Id. at 305. Cooley explored at some length the meaning of and relationship between
fourth and fifth amendment protections:
it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be
liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and
papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspi-
cious persons; and all this under the direction of a mere ministerial officer, who brings
with him such assistants as he pleases, and who will select them more often with refer-
ence to physical strength and courage than to their sensitive regard to the rights and
feelings of others.
Id. at 375. Echoes of this statement reappear in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886),
and in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes. J., dissenting). In a footnote,
Cooley went on to explain, "[t]he fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
found also in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the seizure of one's papers in order
to obtain evidence against him; and the spirit of the fifth amendment-that no person shall be
compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself-would also forbid such seizure."
T. COOLEY, supra note 143, at 374 n.4.
150. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). In this case, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a federal statute which required the production of private books and papers in civil cases
involving disputed custom duties, on pain of forfeiture of the goods in question. In 1976, the
United States Supreme Court declared that Boyd has "not stood the test of time." Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976).
151. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Bradley expressly adopted Cooley's view of fourth and fifth amendment protections against gov-
emmental invasions of individual privacy, just as Warren and Brandeis later adopted Cooley's
notion of the "right to be let alone." Id. at 630.
152. Id.
153. Warren & Brandeis, sumpra note 1, at 220.
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what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communi-
cated to others."' 154
NEITHER LAISSEZ-FAIRE NOR ELITISM
Warren's and Brandeis' right to privacy was not, of course, the
only fruit of nineteenth century American individualism. For example,
both the elitist doctrines of social Darwinism and the laissezfaire doc-
trines of economic substantive due process had already developed out
of the tradition of American individualism by the time Warren and
Brandeis wrote about the right to privacy in 1890. Comparison of War-
ren's and Brandeis' original conception of the right to privacy with the
two contemporaneous doctrines of laissezfaire and elitism helps more
clearly to define Warren's and Brandeis' concept by illuminating a
number of implications and applications which Warren and Brandeis
never intended the right to privacy to have.
The laissezfaire doctrine of economic substantive due process con-
strued the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
as protections for economic enterprise from interference by government
regulations. It did so in the name of individualism-in particular, indi-
vidual rights to liberty and property. In the very year Warren and
Brandeis published their argument for the right to privacy, the United
States Supreme Court adopted this doctrine in Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota."55 Earlier, there had been a number of
influential state court rulings which adopted the language of individu-
alism in imposing this laissez faire doctrine. 156  Both Cooley and
Tiedeman, two of the most influential constitutional scholars in the
post-Civil War period, included in their treatises on the limitations of
government power similar justifications of economic substantive due
154. Id. at 198.
155. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
156. For example, in 1885 the New York Court of Appeals had struck down a law prohibiting
the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses as violating due process guarantees of liberty and
property precisely because such a regulation interfered with individualism:
[Such regulation] interfers with the profitable and free use of his property by the owner
or lessee of a tenement-house who is a cigar-maker, and trammels him in the application
of his industry and the disposition of his labor, and thus, in a strictly legitimate sense, it
arbitrarily deprives him of his property and some portion of his personal liberty.
In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 120, 127 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1885). Similarly, in 1886 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had held unconstitutional a statute requiring certain companies to pay cash wages, instead
of rights to purchase at company stores, as an infringement of the employee's basic individualism:
[Ilt is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not
only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United
States.
He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his
employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him
from doing so is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vi-
cious and void.
Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 437 (1886).
19791
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process as a necessary protection for individualism.- 7
These and other proponents of economic substantive due process
were concerned about the individual's right affirmatively and publicly
to assert himself through economic activities. They saw governmental
regulation of such activities as unconstitutional interference with indi-
vidual rights to liberty and property. Based on the theories of classical
laissez-faire economics"15 and the elitist doctrines of the social
Darwinists, discussed below, economic substantive due process viewed
the individual as aggressive and self-seeking, locked in fierce competi-
tion for material survival with other economically motivated individu-
als. This economic competition among individuals was, accordingly,
viewed as serving both the interests of surviving individuals and the
greatest good of the society as a whole.
Warren and Brandeis were certainly well aware of economic sub-
stantive due process, since they more or less specialized in commercial
and regulatory law;15 9 but they carefully designed the right to privacy
to have a completely different focus. In the first place, Warren and
Brandeis deliberately grounded the right to privacy in the right to life.
As noted above, they explicitly rejected any association of the right to
privacy with rights to liberty or property. 160 Instead of being concerned
about the individual's external possessions and economic and political
activities, Warren and Brandeis deliberately turned inward to focus on
each individual's need to protect his or her internal, spiritual existence,
his or her feelings, thoughts, and sentiments. Unlike the competitive,
materialistic premises of nineteenth century economic substantive due
process, the basis of Warren's and Brandeis' argument for the right to
privacy was the psychological or spiritual need of each individual for
control over his or her own life and personal information about it. In
proselytizing for the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis were con-
sciously the disciples of Emerson, not of Adam Smith.
In arguing for the right to privacy of "all persons, whatsoever; [sic]
their position or station, '  Warren and Brandeis were also emphati-
cally not the apostles of Herbert Spencer or Charles Sumner, the most
prominant proponents of social Darwinsim. 162 The social Darwinists
espoused an openly elitist ideology which insisted on the wisdom and
157. See T. COOLEY, supra note 143, at 353-57; see generally C. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON
THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (1886).
158. See generally A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (1776).
159. A. MASON, supra note 2, at 61-62, 86-88.
160. See text & notes 16-20 supra.
161. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
162. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINSIM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1955); H.
SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS (1864); C. SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER
(1883).
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necessity of protecting the prerogatives of the few naturally "fittest"
individuals. It was the mission of these naturally fittest individuals to
"improve the human species," not only by competing and surviving,
but by exploiting the presumably less-fit masses of natural non-
survivors. The social Darwinists assumed that each individual was a
self-seeking economic unit literally competing for survival against the
rest of humanity; their paradigm was the naturally superior capitalist
entrepreneur, who needed elbow room to acquire his goods and exer-
cise his economic power untrammelled by governmental regulation. 63
On the other end of the social and economic scale, less naturally fa-
vored individuals also were entitled to similar non-interference with
their less-favored endeavors, such as selling their labor for whatever
price it would bring.
These doctrines of social Darwinism were part of a more long-
standing anti-democratic tendency to distrust the majority and to fear
the masses of ordinary people. In The Ideological Origins of the Ameri-
can Revolution, Bernard Bailyn pointed out that "at the time of the
American Revolution 'democracy'-a word which denoted the lowest
order of society as well as the form of government in which the com-
mons ruled-was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder
and the early assumption of power by a dictator." In a sermon "On
163. Social Darwinism was of course closely related to laissez-faire economics and the devel-
opment of substantive due process. In his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes
specifically criticized the absorption of social Darwinist doctrine into constitutional due process
guarantees. Holmes described social Darwinism as "an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics." Locbner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905). Holmes felt compelled to
remind the Court that "[a] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez-faire." Id.
at 75.
164. B. BAILYN, supra note 128, at 282. Although there had never been an official aristocracy
or nobility in the United States even in the Revolutionary War era, Americans tended to assume a
social hierarchy:
Americans of 1760 continued to assume, as had their predecessors for generations before,
that a healthy society was a hierarchial society, in which it was natural for some to be
rich and some poor, some honored and some obscure, some powerful and some weak.
And it was believed that superiority was unitary, that the attributes of the favored-
wealth, wisdom, power-had a natural affinity to each other, and hence that political
leadership would naturally rest in the hands of the social leaders. Movement, of course,
there would be: some would fall and some would rise; but manifest, external differences
among men, reflecting the principle of hierarchical order, were necessary and proper,
and would remain; they were intfinsic to the nature of things.
Id. at 302-03. At the time of the American Revolution, even Thomas Paine's Common Sense was
highly controversial among both Tories and Whigs because it called for equality of democratic
representation and a unicameral legislature. For example, John Adams declared himself to be
vehemently opposed to Paine's plan of government because it was "so democratical, without any
restraint or even an attempt at any equilibrium or counterpoise, that is must produce confusion
and every evil work." Id. at 288-89. The framework of the Constitution expressed special concern
about the difficult problem of how to organize a government in a society where "no distinction of
rank existed ... and none were entitled to any rights but such as were common to all." Id. at
284. The results of this concern were, of course, a number of political compromises, including a
bicameral legislature, with an elite Senate and a more democratic, popularly elected, House of
Representatives; and the electoral college, which insulated the election of the President and Vice
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Civil Liberty, Passive Obedience, and Nonresistance" in 1775,
Jonathan Boucher lamented that "the tendency of man in the mass" is
ever "to be presumptuous and self-willed, always disposed and ready to
despise dominion, and to speak evil of dignities."'16 5 James Fenimore
Cooper wholeheartedly agreed.166 Asserting that he "believe[d] himself
to be as good a democrat as there is in America," Cooper warned that
"tyranny can only come from the public, in a democracy, since individ-
uals are powerless, possessing no more rights than it pleases the com-
munity to leave in their hands."' 67 He assailed as "another form of
oppression practiced by the public" the public's "arrogating to itself a
right to inquire into, and to decide on the private acts of individuals,
beyond the cognizance of the laws."' 168 Public inquiry and comment on
the private affairs of such gentlemen as himself was simply envious per-
secution of superior individuals by their inferiors, which promoted me-
diocrity. 169
Even legal writers such as the civil libertarian Francis Leiber, writ-
ing in the middle of the nineteenth century, noted that "liberty as ap-
plied to political man, practically means, in the main, protection or
checks against undue interference" from, among others, "the
masses."'170 The constitutional scholar, Christopher Tiedman, echoed
this fear of the masses overwhelming the individual in the introduction
to his influential Treatise on The Limitations of Police Power in the
United States. In the face of "the great army of discontents and their
apparent power," Tiedman declared, "the conservative classes stand in
constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more
unreasoning than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of the
democratic majority."'171 In writing about life in the post-Civil-War
President from the dangers of direct election by the unreliable masses of ordinary citizens. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 1.
165. Boucher, ON CIVIL LIBERTY, PASSIVE OBEDIENCE, AND NONRESISTANCE (1797), quoted
in B. BAILYN, supra note 128, at 317. Speaking evil (or even good) of dignities was the very
essence of the privacy problem as many elitists, such as Godkin, saw it. But Warren's and Bran-
deis' conception of the right to privacy was far more democratic.
166. Cooper believed that "in all communities, the better opinion, whether as relates to moral
or scientific truths, tastes, manners and facts, is necessarily in keeping of the few; the great major-
ity of mankind being precluded by their opportunities from reaching so high in the mental scale."
J. COOPER, supra note 60, at 185. Cooper defended privacy as a privilege of the gentleman in a
democratic society:.
The social duties of a gentleman are of a high order. The class to which he belongs is the
natural repository of the manners, tastes, tone, and, to a certain extent, of the principles
of a country.. . the indulgence of his very luxuries encourages the skill that contributes
to the comforts of the lowest.
Id. at 147-48.
167. Id. at 70, 196.
168. Id. at 198, 229.
169. Id. at 129-31.
170. F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 53 (1853).
171. C. TiEDMAN, supra note 157, at vii.
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United States, both Henry Adams'7 2 and Henry James 173 echoed this
fear of the masses.
At the time Warren and Brandeis wrote about the right to privacy,
there was among many Americans a real apprehension, which intensi-
fied with the nation's increasing population toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, that individualism itself, as well as the privileges of the
elite, might be crushed by unrestrained democracy.' 74 It is remarkable
that Warren's and Brandeis' article omits even the slightest hint of this
virtual paranoia of the masses which was rampant, particularly among
upperclass Americans, during the closing decades of the nineteenth
century.
Warren's and Brandeis' deliberate avoidance of this elitist ideol-
ogy is brought into sharp relief when compared with the notion of the
right to privacy espoused by E.L. Godkin, whose own article The Rights
of the Citizen, had helped to set the stage for Warren's and Brandeis'
invention of the right to privacy. Like a number of modem critics of
the right to privacy, "75 Godkin insisted that "'privacy' has a different
meaning to different classes or categories of persons, it is, for instance,
one thing to a man who has always lived in his own house, and another
to a man who has always lived in a boardinghouse."' 176 Godkin even
predicted a poor reception for the right to privacy by the masses:
172. H. ADAMS, DEMOCRACY 96-97 (1880).
173. H. JAMES, supra note 54. In the climactic scene, when the heroine was faced with the
choice between the private life of marriage and her public career as an inspirational speaker about
womens' rights, James created a frightening image of the masses as the adversary of private life in
her suitor's "vision of wresting her from the mighty multitude":
He had a throb of uneasiness at his private purpose of balking it of its entertainment, its
victim-a glimpse of the ferocity that lurks in a disappointed mob.
"Not for worlds, not for millions, shall you give yourself to that roaring crowd.
Don't ask me to care for them, or for any one! What do they care for you but to gape and
grin and babble? You are mine, you are not theirs."
Id. at 431-41. Again and again James evoked the noise of an almost bestial crowd waiting for her
to speak: "A general hubbub rose from the floor and the galleries of the hall--the sound of
several thousand people stamping their feet and rapping with their umbrellas and sticks." Id. at
449. For James, the masses were loud and unruly, predatory and dangerous both to individual
personality and to private happiness.
174. Eg., C. TIEDEMAN, supra note 157, at vi-viii; H. ADAMs, supra note 172, at 96-97passim.
175. Eg., Kalven, Privacy and Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Miller, Privacy in the Corporate State: A Constitutional Value of
Dwindling Signficance, 22 J. PuB. L. 3 (1973). See also Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right to Pri-
vacy Consistent with Effective Law Enforcement? 23 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1974).
176. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, supra note 56, at 497. Earlier Godkin had carefully noted:
Of course, the importance attached to this privacy varies in individuals. Intrusion on it
afflicts or annoys different persons in different degrees. It annoys women more than
men, and some men very much more than others. To some persons it causes exquisite
pain to have their private life laid bare to the world.. . .[They] are the element in
society which most contributes to its moral and intellectual growth and that which the
state is more interested in cherishing and protecting. ... [Dignity] is not one of the
incidents of life in a camp, or a barrack, or in a man-of-war, or in a tenement-house, or a
caravan.
Godkin, supra note 12, at 65-66.
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In all the democratic societies today the public is disposed either to
resent attempts at privacy, either of mind and body, or turn them
into ridicule. There is nothing democratic societies dislike so much
today as anything which looks like what is called "exclusiveness"
and all regard for or precautions about privacy are apt to be consid-
ered signs of exclusiveness.' 77
Godkin's repeated insistence on the right to privacy as an exclusive
prerogative of the social and economic elite may explain Warren's and
Brandeis' unwillingness to credit the social Darwinist, Godkin, as the
catalyst for their own consciously egalitarian article.
In any event, Warren and Brandeis expressly turned their backs on
the elitism of Godkin and the social Darwinists when they declared
that the right to privacy was designed "to protect all persons, whatso-
ever; [sic] their position or station from having matters which they may
properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will.' 7 8 The
details of The Right to Privacy provide further evidence that this was a
conscious choice. For example, Warren and Brandeis refer specifically
to the potential application of the right to privacy to vindicate the feel-
ings of the far from upper-class actress, Marion Manola, who objected
to having her photograph taken "surreptitiously and without her con-
sent" while she was appearing in tights on the stage of the Broadway
Theater in New York.'7 9 Moreover, Warren and Brandeis couched
their argument for the right to privacy in painstakingly general terms,
"a people," "community," "neighbors," "brains capable of other
things," which avoid all reference to specific social or economic sta-
tus.'80 Neither the "ignorant and thoughtless" who mistake the relative
importance of personal gossip, nor "the individual" who suffers
"mental pain and distress" from "invasion upon his privacy" are any-
where identified by social or economic class.' 8 ' Warren and Brandeis
even chose a closing image-the individual wielding the right to pri-
vacy as a weapon, like a man protecting his home against idle prurient
curiosity seeking to intrude on him through the back door'18 --which
powerfully alluded to the familiar legal maxim regarding the innate
rights of even "the poorest man." 183
177. Godkin, The .Right to Privacy, supra note 56, at 497. This differential sensitivity to inva-
sions of privacy was the pivotal issue in Henry James' TheReverberator, in which the high sensi-
bilities of the aristocratic Proberts, "decent quiet people who only want to be left alone," were
played off against the bourgeoise attitudes of the Dawsons, who thought it would be fun to be in
the newspapers.
178. Wiaren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-15.
179. Id. at 195 n.7.
180. Id. at 207 passim. Compare Godkin's notion of privacy discussed at notes 175-77 supra.
181. Warren & Brandeis, supra note I, at 196 passim.
182. Id. at 220.
183. See T. COOLEY, supra note 143, at 367 n.4, citing William Pitt's famous speech before
Parliament in 1763.
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Although they were writing at a time when the privileged elite in
America were becoming increasingly concerned about protecting their
privacy from invasion by the growing numbers and varieties of people
with whom they had to rub shoulders, 84 Warren and Brandeis argued
that the right to privacy was a basic right of all individuals, whatever
their social or economic status. They invented a legal theory for a right
to privacy which was an emphatically egalitarian legal protection for
the individual personalities of all type of people, rich and poor, immi-
grant and Brahmin.
CONCLUSION
Although Warren and Brandeis would undoubtedly have been
amazed at the multiplicity of current applications of the right to pri-
vacy, they predicted that anticipating just how the right to privacy
would be applied in actual cases would be "a difficult task." ' 5 Empha-
sizing that the right to privacy should not operate as an all-encompas-
sing absolute right of individuals somehow unilaterally to secede from
the communities in which they lived, Warren and Brandeis pointed out
that there would be circumstances in which "the dignity and conven-
ience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare
or of private justice" for personal information. 86 "Any rule of liabil-
ity" for interference with the right to privacy, they insisted, "must have
in it an elasticity which shall take account of the varying circumstances
of each case."' 87
Nevertheless, Warren and Brandeis did suggest some "general
rules" for imposing legal liability for interference with the right to pri-
vacy.' 8 The legal remedies for which they argued were to apply only
to a fairly narrow category of cases which met two criteria: (1) where
"matters which [individuals] may properly prefer to keep private [had
been] made public against their will,"'8 9 and (2) where such uncon-
sented publication was "beyond the pale of propriety."' 90 Warren and
Brandeis acknowledged that "it is only the more flagrant breaches of
decency and propriety that could in practice be reached."'' Decency
184. See 0. HANDLIN, supra note 35, at 3. Being the son of immigrant parents, it is perhaps
not surprising that Brandeis avoided direct comment on recent population increases through im-
migration. It is noteworthy, however, that Warren and Brandeis scrupulously eschewed Godkin's
term "masses" in favor of the more amiable-sounding "community" and "fellow-citizens." War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196, 215.
185. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 215.
188. Id. at 214-15.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 215.
191. Id. at 216.
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and propriety were, as they well knew, a matter of "taste" and subject
to widely varying opinion. 192 What the right to privacy required was
that the individual should have some ability to enforce his or her deci-
sions as to what personal information should remain private: "The
common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordi-
narily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others."' 93 Warren and Brandeis thus conceived of
the right to privacy as a kind of presumption of individual control over
personal information.
In actual practice, Warren and Brandeis understood that this pre-
sumption of individual control over personal information would be
hedged about by limitations on the imposition of legal liability. They
envisaged two general types of limitations. First, the right to privacy
would apply only in cases involving truly private information:
to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man's life has
ceased to be private, before the publication under consideration has
been made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn; ... the
right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the indi-
vidual or with his consent.194
Second, in some cases the right to privacy would have to yield to coun-
tervailing interests in making the admittedly private information pub-
lic. In this regard, Warren and Brandeis pointed to three types of cases:
cases involving "publication of matter which is of public or general
interest";1 95 cases involving publication under such circumstances as
judicial or legislative proceedings, which would render it "a privileged
communication according to the law of slander and libel"; 196 and cases
involving publication where "the interest of free speech" is involved, as
in cases of oral publications resulting in no special damages.'97 Aside
from these limitations, there should be strict liability for interference
with individual decisions to communicate or not to communicate per-
sonal information. No actual, physical, or monetary damage needed to
be shown, since the injury redressed in vindicating the right to privacy
was "the effect of the publication upon [the individual's] estimate of
himself and upon his own feelings."' 98 Precisely how such damages
were to be measured was apparently to be left to the jury in each case.
Warren and Brandeis invented the right to privacy in the context
192. Id.
193. Id. at 198.
194. Id. at 215, 218.
195. Id. at 214.
196. Id. at 216-17.
197. Id. at 217. As noted above, Warren and Brandeis discussed a specific limitation on the
application of the right to privacy deriving from freedom of speech, but omitted any mention of
freedom of the press.
198. Id. at 197.
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of late nineteenth century America as a legal means of protecting and
encouraging individual decisions whether, when, and how to share
their personalities with others. Believing that the government was al-
ready constrained to respect this right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis
wanted newspapers and other gossipmongers to do the same. It was,
they felt, particularly fitting and necessary for the law to recognize and
to encourage respect for each individual's right to privacy. After all,
encouraging such respect for privacy reinforced that mutual respect es-
sential to bind together a community of free and self-determined indi-
viduals. Emerson had suggested, "[elverything that tends to insulate
the individual-to surround him with barriers of natural respect, so
that each man shall feel the world is his, and man shall treat with man
as a sovereign state with a sovereign state-tends to true union as well
as greatness."1 99 Warren's and Brandeis' right to privacy was a practi-
cal embodiment of that Emersonian ideal.
199. Emerson, supra note 130, at 112-13.
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